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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE • - UTAH 
IN RK \ 
HEN.* *• • KNOWLTON, ] 
Appe . l i a ; i t . . y 
i ' I . _ 380 
PETITION "OR REHEARING 
COMF \ \ t .^  Appellant, h^  -H • t.*irough his Attorney, 
Thorn n Potier-, , J ,O riereuy i^ i
 t * •. 1' - e 
entitled matter, decided »n ih- thirtini . uiv . x^to^i 
;* '^ reasons as r i!)-.w- : 
POINT I: THAT THE LUUKT JJIU ^ .-1 .,1 ^ PROI^F 
WEIGHT TO THE FACT AND POINT OF LAW THAT -\-
KNOWLTON SOUGHT LEGAL ADVICE, AND FOLLOWED 
THAT ADVICE, PRIOR l,"~s "*.*•• MO THE ACT'ON 
COMPLAINED OF HEREIN. 
j • h i c* '" -irf affirmed the Findings :t * i. . 
and Conclusions ^t Law , ,. . . 
followed the recommendations of the Board concerning discipi -«b. 
* , * ' • v Krv •-•j t " h- • -T elated Dl< 
!U2iA) i , •.< i dr- - ; j'luiessioiidi n* JM-.-
' knowing1 y anq intentionally' converting trust funds DHiunyni^ 
ipPt , jt jr. addition, the Board had 
found that there we; e ;n • U.M t. i gating c L rcujnstdi.jes . 
1 
It was undisputed that Mr. Knowlton had funds belonging 
to a client in a "trust" account, and that he removed those funds 
for his own use. There were some disputes concerning who all of 
the proper parties were, and who was interested in the funds, but 
those are not raised by this Petition. This Petition is concerned 
with the Findings of "knowing and intentional" conversion and no 
mitigating circumstances. 
It is undisputed that prior to Mr. Knowlton asserting an 
attorney's lien over the monies in his "trust" account, and the 
removal of those monies, Mr. Knowlton sought the advice of D. Aaron 
Stanton, an attorney licensed in Utah, concerning what action he 
could take to assert his rights to the money. See Transcript of 
Hearing, pages 7 0-7, Testimony of Mr. Stanton. Further, Mr. 
Knowlton acted in accordance with that advice. See Transcript of 
Hearing, pages 148-50, Testimony of Mr. Knowlton. 
Because of the fact that the conduct of Mr. Knowlton's 
that rendered him subject to discipline resulted from his having 
sought and followed specific legal advice, it is difficult to see 
how the conduct could be considered "knowing(ly) and 
intentional(ly)" wrongful. It is even more difficult to see how 
such could not help but be a mitigating circumstance. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that Board of Bar 
Commissioners did not give sufficient and proper weight to the fact 
that Mr. Knowlton was following the advice of counsel in his 
actions, which at a minimum must constitute a mitigating factor, if 
2 
T;i'\ '.J udL ui onversion" was 
"knowing ana i r. Lfiii. nau: ' Therefore, . . i 
reconsider this Disciplinary matter t< determiine the appropriate 
enei . • i iullowed Jeqal advice in 
his conduct. 
CERTIFICATION 
I HENhlUY CRRTIKY '• presented ii 1 good 
faith andAfor delay. 
DATED this __ day oi November, 199 0. 
Thorn D. R o b e r t s 
A t t o r n e y f o r AT • •<•* . . 
CERTTFTCATF ^ ]W1 AVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY ... , , v. <- ^ d __ c •(.. .-
foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING to t.he Office of Bar Counsel 
-** ' 'ike City, Utah 841x1, o.* the _ _ _ * 




This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
In re Benjamin P. Knowlton, No. 880448 
F-220. F I L E D 
October 30, 1990 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
From the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah State Bar 
Attorneys: Christine A. Burdick, Salt Lake City, for Utah State 
Bar 
Thorn D. Roberts, Salt Lake City, for Knowlton 
STEWART, Justice: 
Attorney Benjamin P. Knowlton petitioned this Court to 
review the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
recommendation for discipline of the Board of Commissioners of 
the Utah State Bar. After investigation "and hearings by a 
hearing panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Bar, 
the Board adopted the panel's conclusions that Knowlton violated 
the following provisions of the Utah Code of Professional 
Responsibility (1971): DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty), DR 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that 
adversely reflects on fitness to practice law), and DR 9-101 
(failing to avoid even the appearance of impropriety).1 The 
Board recommended that Knowlton be suspended from the practice 
of law for six months, with five months stayed on the condition 
that Knowlton pay $4,999.95 to Karen Basso Lehmberg Trujillo as 
restitution prior to the conclusion of the six-month suspension 
period. The Board recommended that, if Knowlton does not make 
restitution by the end of the six months, he be suspended for 
1. The Utah Code of Professional Responsibility is found in the 
Utah Revised Rules of Professional Conduct. This Court adopted 
new rules of professional conduct, effective January 1, 1988. 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct (1988). The conduct in the 
instant case occurred prior to 1988. 
the remaining five months. Knowlton challenges both the 
findings of fact and the recommendation for discipline. 
Knowlton was retained by Ellis and Karen Lehmberg, who 
at the time were husband and wife, to negotiate the sale of a 
house legally owned by Ellis Lehmberg and Karen's parents, Henry 
and Elaine Basso. Karen Lehmberg had previously been the sole 
owner of the house, but had quitclaimed her interest to her 
husband, Ellis Lehmberg, and her parents to avoid certain 
obligations arising from a prior marriage. Knowlton 
successfully completed the sale of the house in April 1982 and 
was paid $2,000 for his legal services. The sale produced net 
proceeds of $5,599.95, which Knowlton deposited in his trust 
account. 
Karen Lehmberg filed for divorce within two weeks of 
the sale of the house, and the sale proceeds became a disputed 
marital asset. Knowlton did not represent either Ellis or Karen 
in the divorce proceeding. However, Knowlton attended a hearing 
in the divorce proceeding where he acknowledged to Judge Uno, 
the district court judge presiding over the divorce proceeding, 
that he was holding the proceeds from the sale of the house in 
trust. Judge Uno ordered Knowlton to continue to hold the 
monies in trust, except for $600, which was to be used to repair 
a car belonging to Karen and Ellis. 
The cash that Knowlton held in trust was awarded to 
Karen Lehmberg in the divorce proceeding. After being informed 
by Karen Lehmberg's counsel that the trust monies had been 
awarded to her and not to Ellis Lehmberg, Knowlton claimed an 
attorney's lien pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-41 (1987) 
(amended 1989) for legal fees owed him for services performed 
for Ellis Lehmberg. The Board found, "[Knowlton] did not 
establish by sufficient and clear evidence the amount of the 
attorney's lien which he claimed; all evidence with respect to 
the amount of outstanding attorney's fees owed by Ellis Lehmberg 
was, at best, speculative." When Knowlton did not pay the trust 
monies to Karen Lehmberg, she pursued a civil action and 
obtained a judgment against Knowlton in the amount of $5,599.95, 
plus interest from February 5, 1983.2 
In May 1986, the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the 
Bar issued a formal complaint against Knowlton, and hearings 
were held in February 1988. The hearing panel concluded that 
Knowlton had violated the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct 
and recommended the discipline ultimately adopted by the Board. 
The hearing panel found that Knowlton intentionally converted 
the trust monies to his personal use and that his intentional 
conduct was an aggravating factor. The panel found no 
2. The Board did not find that Knowlton's nonpayment of the 
civil judgment was an ethical violation, and nonpayment of the 
judgment is not an issue on appeal. 
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mitigating factors. Knowlton stipulated to the recommendation 
of discipline, although he did not stipulate to the findings of 
fact or conclusions of law. 
This Court will not overturn the Board's findings 
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or plainly in error, la 
re Johnston, 524 P.2d 593, 594 (Utah 1974); In re Bridwell, 25 
Utah 2d 1, 2, 474 P.2d 116, 116 (1970); In re Fullmer, 17 Utah 
2d 121, 122, 405 P.2d 343, 344 (1965). Nevertheless, we may 
accord less deference to Board findings because of the unique 
nature of disciplinary actions and our knowledge of the nature 
of the practice of law. Although we adopt the "arbitrary- or 
"capricious" standard for evaluating the factual findings of the 
Board, we do so only as a general proposition and reserve the 
right to draw inferences from basic facts, which may differ from 
the inferences drawn by the Board. 
Moreover, there is a valid distinction for review 
purposes between the Board's findings and its recommendations. 
In re Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d at 2, 474 P.2d at 116. We have 
observed that -we do not consider the recommendations of 
punishment made by the Bar to be in the same category as we do 
their findings of fact, because it is our responsibility to 
discipline an erring attorney . . . .- Xfl. We need not, 
therefore, defer to the Board in deciding what may constitute 
appropriate discipline. In this regard, it is imperative to 
bear in mind that the review of attorney disciplinary 
proceedings is fundamentally different from judicial review of 
administrative agency proceedings. The Utah Constitution 
authorizes this Court's power to regulate the practice of law, 
and that includes the promulgation of rules of discipline and 
enforcement of ethical obligations of attorneys. Utah Const, 
art. VIII, § 4. 
The courts have traditionally regulated the practice of 
law, often with the assistance of bar associations. Although 
the Utah State Bar performs essential functions in investigating 
complaints, adjudicating facts, and recommending discipline, it 
is this Court that is ultimately responsible for bar 
discipline. The matter of sanctions often raises delicate and 
difficult issues, because sanctions can destroy a lawyer's 
professional life and livelihood. However, sanctions are 
essential to protect the public from unethical conduct. 
Imposing sanctions that protect the public and, at the same 
time, are appropriate to the offense requires careful 
consideration of a number of factors by those who are familiar 
with the practice of law, professional standards, and practice 
before the courts of the state. 
Our case law reflects the relationship between this 
Court and the Bar. The Bar's findings and recommendations are 
advisory only. In re Judd, 629 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1981); In re 
Hansen, 586 P.2d 413, 417 n.4 (Utah 1978); In re Hansen, 584 
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P.2d 805, 807 (Utah 1978). The Court is not bound by the 
recommendation of the Board. In re Blackham, 588 P.2d 694, 696 
(Utah 1978); In re Hughes. 534 P.2d 892, 892 (Utah 1975); In re 
Eloa, 7 Utah 2d 258, 260, 322 P.2d 1095, 1096 (1958). Indeed, 
this Court has on a number of occasions departed from the Bar's 
recommendation. Blackham, 588 P.2d 694 (two-year suspension 
recommended; public censure, reprimand, and payment of costs 
ordered); Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (one-year disbarment recommended; 
public reprimand and restitution ordered); Hansen, 584 P.2d 805 
(one-year suspension recommended; public censure, reprimand, and 
payment of actual and necessary expenses of the Bar ordered); In 
re Badger, 27 Utah 2d 174, 493 P.2d 1273 (1972) (disbarment 
recommended; disbarment ordered), order set aside, 28 Utah 2d 
240, 501 P.2d 106 (1972) (two-year suspension ordered); 
Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d 1, 474 P.2d 116 (disbarment recommended; 
one-year suspension and payment of expenses of the Bar 
ordered). See also In re Judd, 682 P.2d 302, 304 (Utah 1984) 
(citing Hansen, 584 P.2d 805). 
In sum, this Court will ordinarily presume that the 
Board's findings of fact are correct, although we may set those 
findings aside if they are not supported by the evidence. If 
the evidence warrants, we may make an independent judgment 
regarding the appropriate level of discipline, although we 
always give serious consideration to the findings and 
recommendations of the Board. These standards are similar to 
the standards of review applied in a number of other 
jurisdictions. Burrell v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Alaska Bar 
Ass'n, 702 P.2d 240, 242 (Alaska 1985); In re Arrick, 161 Ariz. 
16, 18, 775 P.2d 1080, 1082 (1989) (en banc); Jones v, State Pat. 
of Cal., 49 Cal. 3d 273, 286, 777 P.2d 170, 178, 261 Cal. Rptr. 
397, 405 (1989) (en banc); Disciplinary Bdt of the Haw. Supreme 
Court v. Beraan, 60 Haw. 546, 554-55, 592 P.2d 814, 819 (1979); 
In re Lutz, 100 Idaho 45, 48, 592 P.2d 1362, 1365 (1979); State 
Bar of Hey, v, Claiborne, 756 P.2d 464, 471 (Nev. 1988); state 
ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Cantrell, 734 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Okla. 
1987). 
The Board adopted the proposed findings of the hearing 
panel that Knowlton violated DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 1-102(A)(6), and 
DR 9-101 of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct. The 
Board properly found that Knowlton's act of converting funds 
belonging to one client as payment for a debt owed by another 
client is dishonest conduct under DR 1-102(A)(4). 
The record indicates that Knowlton knew he held the 
$4,999.95 in trust; indeed, he acknowledged to Judge Uno in open 
court that he held those monies in trust. Knowlton argues, 
however, that he had performed legal services for Ellis Lehmberg 
for which he was not paid and that after seeking legal advice, 
he asserted an attorney's lien against the trust monies. The 
Board found that Knowlton did not establish a valid attorney's 
lien and that the funds were the property of Karen Lehmberg and 
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not proceeds produced by Knowlton for Ellis Lehmberg.3 When 
the district court awarded monies plus interest to Karen 
Lehmberg in the divorce proceeding, Knowlton had a duty to 
either surrender the monies or appeal the court order if he 
thought it deprived him of a lawful attorney's lien. 
Knowlton maintains that he did not intentionally 
convert the trust monies but that, after seeking legal advice, 
he erroneously asserted an attorney's lien and merely made an 
honest mistake of judgment. Arguably, this explanation was 
possible in view of the fact that Knowlton had represented Ellis 
and Karen Lehmberg in the sale of their house. Nevertheless, 
the Board found that Knowlton's conversion of the funds was 
knowing and intentional. The Board's determination that 
Knowlton violated DR 1-102(A)(4) is supported by the evidence, 
especially in view of the court order directing Knowlton to 
retain the funds in trust. Since Knowlton's conduct is in 
violation of DR 1-102(A)(4), we do not need to address the issue 
of whether Knowlton violated DR 1-102(A)(6) and DR 9-101.4 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-41 (1987) (amended 1989) provided 
for an attorney's lien in certain circumstances: 
The compensation of an attorney and 
counselor for his services is governed by 
agreement, express or implied, which is not 
restrained by law. From the commencement 
of an action, or the service of an answer 
containing a counterclaim, the attorney who 
appears for a party has a lien upon his 
client's cause of action or counterclaim, 
which attaches to a verdict, report, 
decision or judgment in his client's favor 
and to the proceeds thereof in whosesoever 
hands they may come, and cannot be affected 
by any settlement between the parties 
before or after judgment. 
4. A majority of the Court has determined that it is 
unnecessary to address Knowlton's other violations. However, I 
believe that the Board's determination that Knowlton violated 
DR 9-101 is not supported by the evidence. At the Hme in 
question, DR 9-101 stated: 
DR 9-101 Avoiding Even the Appearance 
Impropriety. 
(A) A lawyer
 shall not accept private 
employment in a matter upon the merits of 
which he has acted in a judicial capacity. 
(B) A lawyer shall not accept private 
employment in a matter in which he had 
substantial responsibility while he was a 
public employee. 
(C) A lawyer shall not state or Imply that 
he is able to influence improperly or upon 
(continued on 
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Rule VII(b) of the Procedures of Discipline of the 
Utah State Bar provides: ••Any term of suspension may be stayed 
by the Supreme Court conditioned on the suspended attorney's 
compliance with certain terms and conditions of the stayed 
suspension,w In this case, the Board recommended that Knowlton 
be suspended from the practice of law for six months, with five 
months stayed subject to the conditions that (1) Knowlton 
actually be suspended for 30 days; (2) Knowlton pay restitution 
of $4,999,95 to Karen Lehmberg Trujillo prior to the conclusion 
of the six-month period of suspension; and (3) Knowlton pay the 
Bar's costs of prosecuting these proceedings. Additionally, 
the Board recommended that should Knowlton fail to comply with 
the order of discipline and payment of restitution, he may be 
subject to imposition of the remaining five months of the 
suspension. A majority of the Court believes that this penalty 
is appropriate,5 
The Board's order is affirmed, with the suspension to 
begin two weeks from the date of this opinion. 
(footnote 4 continued) 
irrelevant grounds any tribunal, 
legislative body, or public official. 
None of Knowlton's alleged misconduct involved accepting 
private employment in a matter in which he acted in a judicial 
capacity or as a public employee as prohibited by DR 9-101(A) 
and (B). Nor did his conduct involve implying that he could 
improperly influence a judicial tribunal, legislative body, or 
public official, as prohibited by DR 9-101(C). Although some 
of the ethical considerations found in Canon 9 deal more 
generally with the avoidance of professional impropriety, 
Knowlton did not violate the specific rules found in DR 9-101. 
5. In my view, a six-month suspension, even if five months is 
stayed, is oppressive and unreasonable. A short suspension 
from the practice is sufficient in most cases to destroy an 
attorney's practice. A suspension for six months is tantamount 
to a disbarment. Petitioner's conduct is not, in my view, that 
egregious. In any event, bar disciplines are not the 
equivalent of criminal sanctions, yet that seems to be the 
model the Bar has adopted. I think that it is ill-advised to 
impose an overlong period of suspension and then stay part of 
it to gain leverage to compel an attorney to comply with other 
specific remedies. There are ample means to compel compliance 
short of that. 
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WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall# Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice Concurring and Dissenting) 
I join the opinion of Justice Stewart, except that I 
would not give Knowlton six months to pay the $4,999.95 in 
restitution to Ms. Trujillo, an amount which has been due her 
for many years. This was the Bar's recommendation, but here, I 
part company with the Bar, I can see no justification for such 
a long repayment period. I would require Knowlton to repay that 
sum within one month of the date of this opinion* 
Howe, Associate Chief Justice, concurs in the 
concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Zimmerman-
7 No. 880448 
